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Collective Bargaining in Central European Subsidiaries of Multinationals Report on Trade Union Experiences in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia International
Labour Organization
List of Figures Figure 2: Trade Union Membership Level in Multinational Food and Beverages Companies Figure 3: Trade Union Membership Level in Domestic Owned Food and Beverages Companies Figure 8: Bargaining Levels in the Multinationals of Food and Beverage Industry Figure 11: Bargaining Atmosphere in Multinationals, Food and Beverages Industr Figure 12: Bargaining Atmosphere in the Domestic Owned Companies, Food and Beverages Industry Figure 13: Bargaining Duration in the Multinationals of Food and Beverages Industry Figure 14: Bargaining Duration in Domestic Owned Companies of Food and Beverages Industry Figure 15: Approval of the Bargaining Result in the Multinationals of Food and Beverages Industry Figure 18: Provisions of Collective Agreements in the Multinationals of Food and Beverages Industry. Figure 22: Trade Union membership Level in Multinational Metal Companies Figure 23: Trade Union Membership Level in Domestic Owned Metal Companies Figure 29: Bargaining Levels in Multinationals of Metal Industry Figure 30: Counterpart of Trade Unions in the Negotiating Process, Multinationals in Metal Industry Figure 32: Bargaining Atmosphere in Multinationals, Metal Industry Figure 33: Bargaining Atmosphere in Domestic Owned Companies, Metal Industry Figure 34: Bargaining Duration in the Multinationals of Metal Industry. Figure 36: Provisions of Collective Agreements in the Multinationals of Metal Industry Figure 37: Working Arrangements in the Collective Agreements of Multinationals, Metal Industry List of Tables Table 1: Subsidiaries of the Multinationals and their Ownership, Food and Beverages Industry Table 4: Subsidiaries of the Multinationals and their Ownership, Food and Beverages Industry This comparative study concerns collective bargaining in the subsidiary companies of multinationals in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. It includes 15 subsidiaries of 7 multinationals in food and beverages industry and 15 subsidiaries of 7 multinationals in metal industry. Domestic owned companies are used as comparison groups. The study provides information on differences and similarities in the experiences of trade union/employee representatives employed by:
The questionnaire included 50 multiple-choice questions on trade unions position in bargaining units, disclosure of information for collective bargaining and employees’ participation in the decision making bodies of companies, process of collective bargaining and content of collective agreements. This survey complements the ILO survey on trade union experiences in collective bargaining which was conducted in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in 1995. The domestic comparison groups for the survey on multinationals derive from the material of this ILO survey. Basically the same questionnaire was used in both surveys. Also, distribution of questionnaires was organized the same way. Trade union confederations of each survey country distributed the questionnaires to trade union representatives who were members of negotiating teams in collective bargaining. Main difference in the methodology of these two surveys was in the selection of companies. The multinationals were not selected by trade union confederations. Each confederation was given a list of multinationals in order to involve companies of same ownership in the study. Originally, the idea was to survey all Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Slovakian units of ten multinationals from food and beverages industry, chemical industry, metal industry, retail trade and transportation. For various reasons, the forms returned by the trade union confederations were only partly from the list they were provided with. Also, the number of returned forms was not sufficient. However, the samples of food and beverages industry and metal industry were complemented by interviews so that the comparison became possible. Ownership and Subsidiaries of the Multinationals The sample of the food and beverages industry included units from 7 multinationals. Altogether 19 forms were filled in the subsidiaries of these multinationals. (Table 1) In three Bulgarian manufacturing units, each trade union confederation, KNSB and Podkrepa, filled one form. Although, both forms covered the same unit, the answers differed from each others. In one Hungarian unit, both the management and the trade union representative filled each one form. One of the forms covered the information on collective agreement of two different companies having different parent company, but belonging to the same bargaining unit. Altogether, 15 units were surveyed, excluding Nestle’s unit in Czech Republic which was partly covered by the form filled in Danone. Most of these units had been foreign owned maximum 2 years. Table 1: Subsidiaries of the Multinationals and their Ownership, Food and Beverages Industry
Danone has production in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The main products are in Bulgaria, dairy products, in Czech Republic, biscuits and confectionery, in Hungary dairy products and in Poland dairy products. Except for Bulgaria, all subsidiaries have also distribution units. Czech Republic distributes Evian and Amora. Hungary distributes Kronenbourg, Evian, Tourtel, Amora and LU. Poland distributes Volvic, Kronenbourg, Tourtel, Bledina, LU and Jacob. In Hungary one questionnaire was filled by the trade union representative and one by the company management. Heineken and Hellenic Bottling Company own fifty-fifty the Brewinvest S.A. in Bulgaria. Heineken owns it through its subsidiary Athenian Brewery that is Greek-registered, but controlled by Heineken. Zagorka is fully owned by Brewinvest S.A. In Zagorka, the questionnaire was filled by both KNSB and Podkrepa. Hellenic Bottling Company produces and distributes products of the Coca-Cola Company in Bulgaria. Interbrew has three breweries in Bulgaria (Burgasko Pivo, Kamenitza and Astika). The questionnaire was filled in all three breweries, and in Kamenitza it was filled by both KNSB and Podkrepa. Interbrew has breweries also in Hungary, but these breweries were not surveyed. Nestle has production in all five countries. In Bulgaria, it produces chocolate and confectionery. In Czech Republic, it produces beverages and chocolate and confectionery. In Slovakia, it produces prepared dishes and cooking aids. In Hungary, it produces beverages, chocolate and confectionery and prepared dishes and cooking aids. In Poland, it produces beverages and chocolate and confectionery. In addition Nestle has also sales and marketing units in these countries. In Czech Republic, according to the Foodstuff Workers Union, Nestle Food s.r.o. has a common collective agreement with Danone. The questionnaire was filled in Danone, but information on collective agreement applies also to Nestle. In all other countries Nestle has its own company level collective agreement, that covers all Nestle units within the country. For example, in Hungary, Nestle has three factories (Budapest, Szerencsi Gyara, Diosgyori Gyara), that have a common collective agreement. The questionnaire was filled in Szerencsi by the person who represents Nestle employees in the collective bargaining. Those parts of the questionnaire that concern information on the establishment and trade unions position in it were filled also by an employee representative of the Budapest establishment. In Bulgaria, the questionnaire was filled by two persons representing different trade union organizations, but employed by the same establishment. Philip Morris Companies owns Kraft Jacobs Suchard which is the European unit of Philip Morris Companies’ food division Kraft General Foods International. In Bulgaria, where Kraft Jacobs Suchard bought the Republika Confectionery Company in 1993, the main product is chocolate. In addition to production, it also markets and distributes the products. Kraft Jacobs Suchard has production also in Czech Republic (coffee and spices), Hungary (confectionery), Poland (wafer) and in Slovakia (confectionery). Sara Lee Corporation holds a 100% equity interest in Sara Lee/DE. One of the companies of Sara Lee/DE is Douwe Egberts Nederland B.V. This company manufactures coffee, tea, rice and desserts. It belongs to the Coffee and Grocery division of Sara Lee Corporation. Also Compack Douwe Egberts in Hungary belongs to this division. Douwe Egberts is the flagship coffee brand of the Sara Lee Corporation. In addition to Compack Douwe Egberts, Sara Lee Corporation has also another company in Hungary, Compack Household Personal Care, that belongs to the Household and Body Care Division. Sara Lee Corporation has production also in Czech Republic. Balirny Douwe Egberts belongs to the Coffee and Grocery division and Balirny Household and Personal Care belongs to the Household and Body Care division. The Czech units were not included to the survey. Domestic Owned Companies as a Comparison Group ILO Survey on Trade Union Experiences in Collective Bargaining in Central Europe which was conducted in 1995 included 230 units of food and beverages industry, 92 in Bulgaria, 10 in Czech Republic, 52 in Hungary, 63 in Poland and 18 in Slovakia. The comparison groups for the study on multinational companies was formed of domestic owned food and beverages companies in Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Poland. In Hungary and Slovakia, the units of the comparison group are not only domestic owned, but also privatized. The number of units in the comparison groups is as follows: Bulgaria 83, Czech Republic 7, Poland 9, Hungary 54, Slovakia 10. In Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Poland, the number of units would have been maximum four, if only the privatized domestic owned companies would have been selected. Including public owned companies in the comparison groups is regrettable, because public owned companies differ from private owned companies in collective bargaining. The ILO survey revealed that compared to similarities, the differences between the survey countries were manifold in collective bargaining and collective agreements. Bulgaria differed most from the other survey countries. This, in addition to the differences in the composition of the comparison groups, is one reason why the groups of different countries are not joined together into one group. Also, nine units out of the fifteen multinational units are located in Bulgaria. So, in this respect the Bulgarian comparison group is most relevant. Employment, Turnover and Markets The number of employees had decreased in 4 units and increased in 4 units since the unit became foreign owned or started as foreign owned. (Figure 1) In the Hungarian unit of Sara Lee Corporation, the trade union representative did not know the number of employees. He estimated that it is 500-1,000 and was 1,400-1,600 when the unit became foreign owned in 1991. Altogether 4 units did not know how many people were employed when the unit became foreign owned. Danone’s unit in Poland suggested that the number would have increased. Most of the respondents did not know the number of part time workers. Only 6 were positive that there were no part time workers and only 2 knew the number of part time workers. Figure 1: Number of Employees in 1996 and when the Unit Became Foreign Owned
In Bulgaria, many of the sale contracts between the Privatization Agency and the purchaser include a liability to maintain the existing level of jobs for a certain period. The contract, concluded with Nestle on June 3, 1994, bound Nestle to keep up the existing 1,085 jobs for a period of 1 year in the former Sh. Z.I. -Sofia. Also, Nestle was obliged to invest at least 7 million USD in 5 years period. The sale contract of Astika JSC, concluded on January 18, 1995, obliged the purchaser to preserve all 308 jobs, and invest 16.6 million USD in 5 years period. The sale contract of Kamenitza JSC, concluded on January 25, 1995, obliged the purchaser to employ continuously at least 300 people in the period of next five years and invest at least 31.8 million DEM within 7 years. The sale contract of Zagorka SPSC, concluded on October 28, 1994, obliged the purchaser to increase the number of employees from 484 to at least 493 within five years and invest 41.4 million USD in 5 years term. Danone’s unit in Czech Republic had a social plan for reducing the number of employees. The methods for reducing employees had been voluntary redundancies, compulsory redundancies and early retirement. Also in Nestle’s Hungarian and Slovakian units and in Compack Douwe Egberts (Hungary), all three methods were used. In Nestle (Slovakia), most of the redundancies had been voluntary. Only 8 people had been made redundant against their will and 5 people had retired early out of 40 people that had been made redundant over the 3 last years. In Nestle (Bulgaria), only voluntary redundancies were used. Only in Compack Douwe Egberts (Hungary) a significant turnover of employees (more than 50%) had taken place when the unit had became foreign owned. In most units, the annual turnover had increased over the last three years. It had decreased only in Compack Douwe Egberts (Hungary). But obviously the respondents were not very sure about the turnover. This was indicated by two things. First, only two respondents (Cokoladovny and Kamenitza) knew the unit’s turnover in the last financial year. Second, the information given by representatives of KNSB and PODKREPA on the change in the turnover was different. According to KNSB, there was no change in the turnover of Nestle, but according to PODKREPA, the turnover had decreased. According to KNSB, the turnover of Zagorka had decreased, but according to PODKREPA, it had increased. Most respondents described the markets for the unit’s products as national. Only 8 units had export. These units were Danone’s units in Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Nestle’s units in Hungary and Poland, Kraft Jacobs Suchard and Astika in Bulgaria and Compack Douwe Egberts in Hungary. In most units, the trade union membership level was of 51-75%. All Nestle units were alike. (Figure 2) The membership level was higher in domestic owned companies. (Figure 3) Figure 2: Trade Union Membership Level in Multinational Food and Beverages Companies
Figure 3: Trade Union Membership Level in Domestic Owned Food and Beverages Companies
In most units, the trade union membership level had declined over the last three years. (Figure 4) However, KNSB and PODKREPA had different answers in each unit where both of them were represented. According to KNSB, the membership level had declined in Zagorka, but according to PODKREPA, it had stayed the same. KNSB had noticed no change in Nestle, while PODKREPA had noticed a decline. In Kamenitza, PODKREPA had noticed an increase, while KNSB had noticed no change.
Decline in trade union membership level did not always indicate a decrease in trade union influence. Out of those 6 units where trade union membership level had declined, only 2 units (Danone in Czech Republic and Burgasko Pivo) had experienced a decline in trade union influence over the last three years. All other respondents reported "no change" in trade union’s influence in the bargaining unit. Also, 2 out of those 4 units where trade union membership level had remained the same had experienced an increase in trade union influence. These units were Kamenitza and Zagorka. Though, only PODKREPA had experienced an increase in Zagorka. Trade union influence had increased in 4 of those 5 units where trade union membership level had increased. In Poland, Nestle’s unit had experienced no change in trade union influence. Decline in membership level was much more typical of domestic owned companies than multinationals. (Figure 5) In Bulgaria, where the decline percentage was the lowest among domestic owned companies, 31% of the domestic owned had experienced a decline in the membership level, whereas only 25% of the multinationals. But, like respondents in multinationals, also respondents in domestic owned units felt in many cases where the membership level had declined that the trade unions’ influence had increased or at least stayed the same.
In most units, more than one trade union confederation was represented, and in all these cases all confederations were represented in the bargaining process through their affiliated trade unions. (Table 2) However, it has to be noticed that most units were from Bulgaria. There was only one unit from Czech Republic and Slovakia. Only in Danone’s unit in Poland, a company trade union that was not affiliated to any confederation was represented. The Independent Trade Union of Employees of Danone Company represented 80% of the Danone employees, while only 20% of the Danone employees were members of the national NSZZ Solidarnosc. The relationship between trade unions belonging to different trade union confederations was co-operative in all units except for one. In Nestle’s unit in Poland, the relationship was described as constructive competition. Some respondents pointed out that the relations varied, and were depending mostly on personal reasons.
*This is KNSB’s version. According to PODKREPA, KNSB is not represented in the unit and there are three trade unions in the unit. **This is KNSB’s version. According to PODKREPA, ADC (Association of the Democratic Syndicates) is not represented in the collective bargaining. Employees’ Participation in the Decision Making Process In nine units, the respondents described the relations between the trade unions and the employer as co-operative. Constructive opposition or both partnership and opposition prevailed the relations in other units. Open confrontation was totally missing. The relations were worse in domestic owned companies. In domestic owned companies, also open confrontation was present. In all units of multinationals, trade unions had organized meetings with the employer. These meetings took place once every month or when necessary. Only in 6 units, all employees were informed about the financial situation of the unit. In 6 units information was given to no employees. (Figure 6) In Kamenitza, PODKREPA reported that information was given to nobody, but KNSB reported that information was given to some trade union activists and to some other employees. In domestic owned food or beverages companies, employees were better informed. (Figure 7) In Bulgaria, no employees were informed in 50% of the multinationals and in 17% of the domestic owned companies.
Trade union representatives or employee representatives were not much consulted or informed about issues related to areas of co-operation and co-determination at work. Most common issues on which the employee representatives or trade union representatives were informed or consulted about were production and dismissals. In Danone’s units in Hungary and Poland, employees were consulted/informed only on dismissals, and in Nestle’s Slovakian unit and Hungarian unit, only on production. In Astika (Bulgaria), information or consultation concerned production and dismissals. In Kamenitza (Bulgaria), it concerned production, hiring, dismissals and short time work, and in Nestle’s unit in Poland, investments, production, hiring and dismissals. In Kraft Jacobs Suchard (Bulgaria) employees were informed/consulted about investments, production, hiring, dismissals and short time work. In Nestle’s Bulgarian unit, Coca Cola (Bulgaria), Zagorka (Bulgaria), Burgasko Pivo (Bulgaria), Danone’s Bulgarian and Czech units and Compack Douwe Egberts (Hungary) information/consultation was given on none of these issues. In 5 of these 6 units, none of the employees were informed about the financial situation of the unit. Only in 3 units, employees were represented on the management bodies of the company. These were Nestle’s units in Poland and Slovakia and Danone’s unit in Czech Republic. Nestle, Danone, Philip Morris and Interbrew have established an European Works Council. Of these multinationals only Danone includes the Eastern and Central European countries as full members in the EWC. In Nestle’s EWC, Eastern and Central European countries are allowed informally to attend annual information meetings by mutual agreement. The Sara Lee/Douwe Egberts draft agreement was not yet signed. However, Hungary and Czech Republic were going to be included in the EWC. Only in 5 units, the respondents knew that their unit was part of an European Community scale undertaking having an European Works Council, and only 3 respondents reported that their unit was represented in the EWC. Respondents from Danone’s Bulgarian and Hungarian units and Compack Douwe Egberts (Hungary) reported that they were represented in EWC. In Nestle’s Hungarian and Polish units, the respondents knew that Nestle has an EWC, but these units had no representation in it. Also in Kraft Jacobs Suchard (Bulgaria), the respondent knew about the EWC, but the Bulgarian unit had no representation. In Nestle’s Bulgarian unit, PODKREPA reported that employees had representation in the Nestle’s EWC, whereas the representative of KNSB did not even know that Nestle has an EWC. Major issues related to collective agreement were usually communicated to the employees through shop stewards or local organization of the trade union. In 10 units these were the only communication methods. Only one unit did not use these methods, Compack Douwe Egberts (Hungary). In this company, the employer used personnel delegates, direct communication to employees and works council in case the issue was a social one. Direct communication to employees was used also by the employers’ of the Czech and Hungarian units of Danone and the Hungarian and Slovakian units of Nestle. Compared to domestic owned food or beverages companies, there were no noteworthy differences in communication methods. The results concerning employees’ participation contradict the information that the headquarters of the multinationals disclose on their human resource and personnel policies. Danone has e.g. the following information on its human resources on its WWW site: "Danone Group has always been aware that lasting success must be built on policies that ensure the personal commitment and dedication of all staff members. Annual meetings with representatives of IUF have already led to the development of constructive ties at the international level, notably through the adoption of joint programs in areas including availability of business and economic information and recognition of union rights." In spite of this program, no employees were informed about the financial situation of the company in the Bulgarian unit and only some employee categories in the Czech unit. In these units, employees were not informed or consulted about any of the issues that traditionally or by law belong to the sphere of cooperation or co-determination in most Western European countries. In Danone’s Polish and Hungarian units, employees were consulted only on dismissals. Nestle states in its Management Report 1995 e.g. the following: "The concept of Management Commitment/Employee Involvement has continued to penetrate every level of the Group, promoting a more intensive dialogue with employees and involving them directly in decision-making, thereby increasing their motivation." The survey results point out that this policy has not been implemented properly in the Central European units. Employees had not been involved directly in decision making in Bulgarian and Hungarian units and none of the units were involved in EWC as equal members with Western European employees. Most units had local level agreement, and 6 units had only local level agreement. (Figure 8) Usually the local level agreement was a company agreement covering all units of the subsidiary company within the country. Two units, both breweries, had only a branch level collective agreement. In Czech Republic, according to the Foodstuff Workers Union, Nestle Food s.r.o. has a common collective agreement with Danone. Figure 8: Bargaining Levels in the Multinationals of Food and Beverage Industry
Those units that were covered by both local and higher level bargaining reported that there was either a high decree of co-ordination (4 units) or a limited decree of co-ordination (3 units) of claims and other bargaining activities between the bargaining levels. Local bargaining was as typical of domestic owned companies as of multinationals. The percentages of local bargaining were amazingly similar. In Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, all domestic owned units bargained at the local level, and in Bulgaria 77% of the domestic owned units bargained at the local level. In Bulgaria, 75% of the multinational units bargained at the local level. But the percentage of those units covered by both local and a higher than local level bargaining was much higher in domestic owned companies than in multinationals in all countries. In most cases, the nationality of the counterpart’s nationality was the same as the nationality of trade union representatives. (Figure 9)
The teams that negotiated the collective agreement on behalf of the employees had received most valuable assistance from municipal, regional and/or national trade union bodies. 6 teams had received at least some assistance from the trade union of the home country of the parent company, 4 teams from ILO and 5 teams from the international trade secretariats. (Table 3)
Out of 15 teams, 8 assessed that without the assistance the team would not have achieved the same results. 4 teams considered that the assistance had no substantial effect on the outcomes and the rest of the teams considered that same results would have been achieved without the assistance, but with effort. Usually the negotiating team was given a mandate within which the team could use its own judgment. In two Hungarian units, Nestle (Hungary) and Danone (Hungary), the teams could make independent decisions and alter the claims drafted in advance. In Bulgaria, the negotiating powers of the team members depended on the trade union they belonged to. In each unit, where both KNSB and PODKREPA answered the questionnaire, the negotiating powers of KNSB differed from those of PODKREPA. In only one unit, Coca Cola (Bulgaria), the claims were defined in advance and the team had to stick to them. The negotiating teams had much more extensive negotiating powers in these multinationals than in the domestic owned food and beverages companies. In Bulgaria, 56% of the teams and in Hungary 32% of the teams in domestic owned companies had to stick to claims defined in advance. Except for Danone’s unit in Bulgaria, all teams made compromises in the negotiating process. Compromises were most common on remuneration and social issues. (Figure 10) In three units, Burgasko Pivo (Bulgaria), Coca Cola (Bulgaria), Danone (Poland), the team made compromises only on remuneration. In Nestle’s Bulgarian unit, the team made compromises only on working time, according to KNSB. Most of the teams made compromises at least on three issues.
In domestic owned food or beverages companies, compromises were made much the same way as in these multinationals. The two most common issues were the same in all countries, except for Czech Republic, but the frequency of compromises on each issue was higher in domestic owned companies. Compromises on holidays and leaves made the biggest difference between the domestic owned companies and multinationals. In all countries, teams in domestic owned companies made more frequently compromises on holidays and leaves, 45% of teams in Bulgaria, 100% in Czech Republic, 35% in Hungary, 50% in Poland and 30% in Slovakia. In 67% of the units, the counterpart was willing to negotiate on all issues listed in the questionnaire. In domestic owned companies, the willingness to negotiate was weaker. In Bulgaria, 58% of the respondents in domestic owned and 75% in the multinationals were willing to negotiate on all issues. In Astika (Bulgaria), the counterpart refused to negotiate on job content, in Danone’s Bulgarian unit on remuneration, job content and trade union facilities, in Danone’s Czech unit on job security, in Compack Douwe Egberts (Hungary) on job content and in Nestle’s Hungarian unit on management’s remuneration. In domestic owned units, it was more typical that the employer refused to negotiate on more than one subject. 10 respondents described the bargaining atmosphere as good and 5 as acceptable. (Figure 11) In domestic owned companies, the atmosphere was worse. (Figure 12) The percentage of acceptable bargaining atmosphere was higher in domestic owned companies in all countries except for Bulgaria. Figure 11: Bargaining Atmosphere in Multinationals, Food and Beverages Industry
Figure 12: Bargaining Atmosphere in the Domestic Owned Companies, Food and Beverages Industry
In most units, the bargaining took at least 6 weeks. (Figure 13) In all Danone’s units, the bargaining took at least 10 weeks (10 weeks in Bulgaria, 12 weeks in Czech Republic, 16 weeks in Hungary and since September 1994 in Poland). In the Polish unit, the management and the company union had not been able to reach a collective agreement so far. In Zagorka (Bulgaria), the bargaining was in progress, and the respondent did not estimate how long it would take. In Compack Douwe Egberts (Hungary), the respondent reported that the bargaining takes 2-6 weeks. Bargaining took shorter time in domestic owned companies. (Figure 14) Figure 13: Bargaining Duration in the Multinationals of Food and Beverages Industry
Figure 14: Bargaining Duration in Domestic Owned Companies of Food and Beverages Industry
The bargaining result was usually approved by the trade union committee/council and/or the negotiating team. (Figure 15) This was the case also in domestic owned companies except for Slovakia, where the general meeting of trade union members was the second common option after the trade union committee/council. KNSB and PODKREPA had different ways to approve the result in Kamenitza. KNSB used the negotiating team and PODKREPA the trade union committee/council. Figure 15: Approval of the Bargaining Result in the Multinationals of Food and Beverages Industry
*KNSB In most units, at least three instruments were used in the reporting/publishing of the bargaining result. (Figure 16) The most common instruments were notice board and union meeting. Each of them was used by 11 units. In addition to these, also newspapers and personnel meetings were used. In each unit where both KNSB and PODKREPA were represented, they had different ways to inform the bargaining result. There were no noteworthy differences between the domestic owned companies and multinationals in reporting/publishing the bargaining result.
*PODKREPA used both notice board and union meeting in Nestle, only union meeting in Kamenitza and in Zagorka. KNSB used only union meeting in Nestle, notice board and union meeting in Kamenitza and union meeting and media in Zagorka. The respondents of those 7 units that were covered by a local collective agreement and some higher level agreement described the relationship of these agreements mainly as supplementary. In Danone’s Bulgarian unit, Astika (Bulgaria), Compack Douwe Egberts (Hungary) and Nestle’s Slovakian unit, the collective agreements dealt with same issues, but the lower level regulations were supplementary to the higher level regulations. In Kraft Jacobs Suchard (Bulgaria), the agreements were complementary, i.e., they dealt with different issues. In Nestle’s Hungarian unit, the agreements were identical. In Burgasko Pivo (Bulgaria), the respondent did not know how the agreements were related to each other. Also in domestic owned companies, the relationship was supplementary in most cases. Except for some Bulgarian units, the collective agreement covered all wage and salary earners in the bargaining unit. In Bulgaria, the legislation differs in this matter from the legislation of all other survey countries. In the following Bulgarian units, the collective agreement covered only those trade union members who belonged to the organizations which had signed the agreement: Astika, Kraft Jacobs Suchard, Kamenitza and Zagorka. In other words, collective agreement covered all wage and salary earners only in 50% of the Bulgarian companies. Among domestic owned units, the situation was almost the same. Only in 52%, collective agreement covered all wage and salary earners. In all units which had a local collective agreement, i.e. in 11 units, basic wage, shift supplements, overtime payments and normal working hours were all determined at the local level by company collective agreement. Local bargaining on wages, shift supplements and overtime payments was less typical of domestic owned companies. (Figure 17) The questionnaire addressed to these companies did not include the question about working hours.
All companies had provisions on the implementation of collective agreement and health care services. (Figure 18) There were some similarities in the collective agreements of those units which are owned by the same company, but located in different countries. All Danone units had provisions on the implementation of collective agreement, right to renegotiate, if inflation exceeds a certain limit, dispute settlement, occupational safety and health and health care services, and none of them had provisions on child care allowances. All Nestle units had provisions on the implementation of collective agreement, right to re-negotiate, if inflation exceeds a certain limit, trade union facilities and health care services, and none of them had provisions on shorter working hours than stipulated in the Labour Code. There were no systematic differences between the collective agreements of foreign and domestic owned companies. Health care services and vocational training were somewhat less typical of domestic owned companies’ collective agreements in all countries. Differences between the survey countries outweighed the differences between domestic and foreign ownership. Figure 18: Provisions of Collective Agreements in the Multinationals of Food and Beverages Industry.
Concerning working arrangements, collective agreements limited most often overtime, night work and shift work. (Figure 19) Nestle units had quite similar collective agreements. All Nestle’s agreements limited overtime and none of them limited part time work, fixed term work, home based work, temporary work or subcontracting. Comparison of Danone’s units was not possible, because the high number of "don’t know" answers. The use of overtime work, night work, fixed term work and shift work had changed more than the use of other working arrangements. However, most respondents did not know the overtime percentage, not even approximately.
There were no systematic differences between the collective agreements of foreign and domestic owned companies. Limitations were somewhat more typical of domestic owned companies. Limitations on part time work were more typical of domestic owned companies in all countries. But, in general, differences between the survey countries outweighed the differences between domestic and foreign ownership. In 8 units, the respondents reported that they had been adequately consulted about the changes in working arrangements. These units were the following: Astika (Bulgaria), Kamenitza (Bulgaria), Kraft Jacobs Suchard (Bulgaria), Danone’s Hungarian unit and all Nestle’s units. Adequate consultation was much more typical of domestic owned units. The minimum duration of collective agreements covering general provisions was usually maximum one year. (Figure 20) The respondent in Nestle’s Polish unit did not know the minimum duration, and the respondent in Nestle’s Hungarian unit reported that there was no minimum duration at all. In Danone’s Hungarian unit, the management reported that the minimum duration was maximum one year, while the trade unionist reported that it is more than two years. In all Bulgarian units where both KNSB and PODKREPA were represented, two different answers were given. In Kamenitza, PODKREPA answered maximum one year and KNSB answered maximum two years, in Zagorka, KNSB answered maximum one year and PODKREPA maximum two years and in Nestle, KNSB answered maximum one year and PODKREPA over two years. There were no noteworthy differences between multinationals and domestic owned companies. Among domestic owned companies, the minimum duration of collective agreements was much longer in Poland than in other survey countries. In Bulgaria, 77% of the collective agreements of domestic owned companies had a minimum duration of maximum one year.
The minimum duration of collective agreements covering wages was maximum one year in 13 units. In Nestle’s Polish unit, it was more than 2 years and Danone’s Hungarian unit did not know the answer. KNSB and PODKREPA had again different answers in Zagorka. In domestic owned companies, the duration was longer. In Poland, 29% of the collective agreements of domestic owned companies were maximum one year, in Hungary 74%, in Slovakia 50%, in Bulgaria 80% and only in Czech Republic 100%. |
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